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Statement of Jurisdiction and Jurisdictional objection 
I do not believe that this court has jurisdiction, as the orders are not final and seek 
to provide a corrected notice to remedy a constitutionally defective notice. Additionally I 
believe the Court of Appeals in Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St. George City, 2015 
Utah App. 158 (hereinafter Mike's Case) was incorrect in it's ruling, ignoring supreme 
court legal precedent, and simply ruled the way it did because Mormons from the state 
government of Utah were requesting the relief, much as Mormons from the state 
government of Utah are requesting relief now, and different standards are applied by the 
Mormon judges of the Court of appeals to grant relief to those they favor over those they 
do not favor. Because I do not believe that a honest opinion will be forthcoming, I am 
including arguments that discuss the merits of the decision and constitutional issues. 
Statement of issues on appeal 
1) The ruling in Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St. George City, 2015 Utah App. 
158 is wrong and contrary to the weight of prior controlling legal precedent from the 
Utah Supreme Court, and a part of a clear pattern of the Court of Appeals ignoring that 
law to grant relief to favored appellants by way of unequal application of the law. 
2) The court of appeals lacks jurisdiction as the order is not final and distinguished 
from the order in Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St. George City, 2015. 
3) On summary disposition it was correctly determined that the notice from the 
Justice court to the DLD was for failure to comply with a citation, but no traffic citation 
ever existed. See R. 586. 
4) On summary disposition it was incorrectly determined that all issues from the 
Justice Court itself were not at issue, and the reviewing court could initiate proceedings 
under the statute. 
5) The entire process, the special ruling by the court of appeals both in Mikes and 
in this case granting jurisdiction when none exists, as well as the complete lack of notice 
at the Justice Court, Administrative level, Trial court, and court of appeals is an 
unconstitutional violation of the 14th Amendments right to due process and an egregious 
example of the State of Utah violating the rights of it's citizens without any due process 
at all. 
Statement of the Case 
The Justice court notified the DLD that a failure to appear for a citation 
(FTA/FTC code) existed for a case in the Holladay Justice Court. See R.458, motion for 
summary disposition of the DLD paragraph 7 and R.503, docket of Holladay Justice 
Court, 7/30/2014 entry on FTA/FTC and attached to the DLD motion for summary 
disposition. By contrast both warrants never had any notification generated to the DLD. 
See Docket at 7/30 at R.502 and on 5/12/2015 at R.491. 
The DLD notified the Plaintiff and Appellee Roger Bryner that he had failed to 
comply with a promise to appear on a citation. The DLD also argued this exact 
undisputed fact in it's motion for summary disposition at paragraph 8 at R.459 and in it's 
exhibit B at R.508. 
The DLD held a hearing on suspension and upheld the suspension. See motion for 
summary disposition of the DLD at paragraph 11 at R.459 
The Plaintiff and Appellee timely sought his de-novo review of right through the 
district court. See motion for summary disposition of the DLD at paragraph 13 at R.459 
The district court found on summary disposition, requested by the DLD itself, that 
the suspension proceedings were initiated for failure to comply with a citation, but that no 
factual basis for this existed in the record of the Justice Court as no failure to comply 
with a citation exists. The district court further found that as a mater of law the correct 
thing to do in this case was to remand to the DLD with instructions to consider factors 
outside the notice from the Justice Court in a new administrative suspension proceeding, 
after which the district court would conduct a de-novo review if necessary. See R.585-
587, order of 6-18-2015. 
The DLD appealed the remand order as if it were a final order on 6-29-2015. See 
R.590-592. 
The Plaintiff and Appellee filed within 14 days a motion argued alternately under 
Rule 54 as a motion to reconsider a non-final order and under Rule 52 to make additional 
findings and clarify the findings already made. See r.595-99 In addition he moved the 
court to take judicial notice of documents from Mike's case. See R.606-627. Those 
findings were eloquently and succulently clarified in an order dated 8-13-2015 at R.640, 
despite additional language denying the motion and ignoring the motion for judicial 
notice. Plaintiff and Appellee filed a cross notice of appeal on 9-4-2015. See R.643. 
Statement of relevant facts 
The relevant facts for this appeal are all found at R.640 where the court correctly 
found on summary disposition: 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, it was undisputed that the notice 
provided by the Division referred to a citation, and likewise undisputed that a 
warrant, and not a citation, was issued by the Justice Court, Based on that the 
Court remanded the matter to the Division to expressly consider the question with 
regard to the existence of a warrant, not as to a citation. See Order dated June 18, 
2015, herein. That Order contemplates no further action by this Court until the 
agency completes its action. No further findings are necessary. 
There is only one legal error in this ruling. That is that the District Court could 
substitute notice from the appellate court in place of the Court that issued the warrant 
providing the notice to the DLD. It is not the place of the district court acting as an 
appellate court to generate notice of a warrant in the first instance. 
Summary of arguments 
1) The ruling in Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St. George City, 2015 Utah App. 
158 is wrong and contrary to the weight of prior controlling legal precedent from the 
Utah Supreme Court, and a part of a clear pattern of the Court of Appeals ignoring that 
law to grant relief to favored appellants by way of unequal application of the law. 
2) The court of appeals lacks jurisdiction as the order is not final and distinguished 
from the order in Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St. George City, 2015. 
3) On summary disposition it was correctly determined that the notice from the 
Justice court to the DLD was for failure to comply with a citation, but no traffic citation 
ever existed. R. 586. 
4) On summary disposition it was incorrectly determined that all issues from the 
Justice Court itself were not at issue, and the reviewing court could initiate proceedings 
under the statute. 
5) The entire process, the special ruling by the court of appeals both in Mikes and 
in this case granting jurisdiction when none exists, as well as the complete lack of notice 
at the Justice Court, Administrative level, Trial court, and court of appeals is an 
unconstitutional violation of the 14th Amendments right to due process and an egregious 
example of the State of Utah violating the rights of it's citizens without any due process 
at all. 
Argument 
Issue 1, Tlte ruling in Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St. George City, 2015 Utah App. 
158 is wrong and contrary to the weigltt of prior controlling legal precedent from the 
Utah Supreme Court, and a part of a clear pattern of the Court of Appeals ignoring 
that law to grant relief to favored appellants by way of unequal application of the law. 
Plaintiff and Appeallee Roger Bryner moves the court to dismiss this case for lack of 
jurisdiction, specifically that Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St. George City, 2015 Utah App. 
158 (hereinafter Mike's Case) is bad precedent, contrary to all prior case law, and has never been 
affirmed or in any way cited by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah or any other court. 
Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins., Co., 44 P.3d 663, 670-71 (Utah 2002) should remain the controlling 
law. A current shepardization of the case is attached as Exhibit C. The entire section of the 
Brief of the Appellee devoted to jurisdiction is reproduced here below, and argument 
incorporated by reference: 
Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear the present appeal is a threshold 
determination that must be made by this Court prior to addressing the issues raised on 
7 
appeal. Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins., Co., 44 P .3d 663, 670-71 (Utah 2002); See also 
Utah R. App. P. 3(a). Furthermore, this Court's subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that 
may be raised at any time. Pearson v. S. Jordan Employee Appeals Bd., 216 P .3d 996, 
997 (Utah Ct. App. 2009). Where jurisdiction is lacking, the appeal must be dismissed. 
Miller, 44 P.3d at 670-71. 
The City invokes this Court's jurisdiction pursuant to U .C.A. § 78A-4-l 03(2)(b ). 
AOB at 1. In contrast to subsection (a) of that statute, subsection (b) does not expressly 
state the appeal must derive from a final order. Compare U.C.A. §§ 78A-4-103(2)(a) and 
103(2)(b ). However, that statute is not the only source of jurisdiction or limit on 
jurisdiction for this Court. The appellate rules of procedure also set forth mandates 
relating to the authority and jurisdiction of this Court. See Utah R. App. P. 3(a). The 
jurisdictional rules set forth in the appellate rules of procedure embody the Utah Supreme 
Court's long held standing that it is the "exclusive judge of its own jurisdiction." Mellor 
v. Wasatch Crest Mut. Ins., 282 P.3d 981, 984 n.3 (Utah 2012)(quoting Powell v. 
Cannon, 179 P.3d 799 (Utah 2008)). In exercising its power as "exclusive judge of its 
own jurisdiction," the Utah Supreme Court has "strictly adhered" to its jurisdictional 
limitation on appeals arising from non-final orders. Id. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court 
has "repeatedly affirmed the viability of the final judgment rule as a barrier to [its] 
jurisdiction." Mellor, 282 P.3d at 982 n.2 (quoting Loffredo v. Holt, 37 P.3d 1070 (Utah 
2001)). Accordingly, Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "[a]n 
appeal may be taken from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final order and judgments ... " (emphasis added). 
8 
Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear the present appeal as it 
arises out of a non-final order. 
An order is final only where it disposes of all claims as between all parties. Id. 
(stating "[w]hen claims remain pending, an order is not final."). To that end it must "must 
end the controversy between the litigants." Miller, 44 P.3d at 670-71 (citing Loffredo, 37 
P .3d I 070). The purpose of this jurisdictional restriction is to prevent "piecemeal appeals 
in the same litigation" and "thereby preserve scarce judicial resources." Loffredo, 37 P.3d 
at 1072. 
The Loffredo Court was addressing whether an appeal of an order which resolved 
all issues but attorney's fees was an appealable final order. Loffredo, 3 7 P .3d at I 071-72. 
The Court concluded that the order was not a final order as an issue remained to be 
addressed by the district court. Id. at 1073. It was not enough that the district court 
addressed the "majority of the issues." Id. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Id. Indeed, for the Loffredo Court 
to have permitted the appeal to move forward would be to "gut the final judgment rule of 
much of its practical meaning and effectiveness." Id. 
In the present case Mike's sought judicial review both as to the issue of substantial 
evidence ( or lack thereof) and as to the meaning and interpretation of the analog law as 
codified in U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g). R. 1-8. Indeed, a major component of the judicial review 
was addressing the interpretation and application of U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g). Id., R. 342-68 
and 413-449. In its purported final order, the district court expressly declined addressing 
Mike's claim on U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) at that time. R. 517-20 and AOB appendix I. 
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Additionally, the district court has never ruled on the claim that the City lacked 
substantial evidence. Id. Instead, the district court determined that it lacked sufficient 
information to make a ruling and remanded the matter to the City for an evidentiary 
hearing. Id. It determined only that the facts were in dispute and the disputed facts could 
not be resolved solely on the written opinions of the experts. Id. Therefore, both claims 
raised by Mike's in its Petition for Judicial Review remain unaddressed by the district 
court. 
Furthermore, it is evident from the language of the order itself that the district 
court was not treating the order as final. The district court stated in its order that "this is 
the final order of the Court until after the City Counsel [sic] holds an evidentiary hearing 
as set forth in paragraph 2 above." Id. ( emphasis added). By the order's own terms it was 
contemplated the matter would be returned to the district court once the evidentiary 
hearing was held. The matter could only be returned to the district court ifthere were 
remaining issues for the Court to address. By definition, where there are issues remaining 
for the district court to resolve the order is not final. Consequently, while the district 
court stylized its order as final, the actual order is not final as it did not address and 
resolve all claims between all parties and left open further action by the district court. 
Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the present appeal and it should be 
dismissed pending a true final order from the district court or permissive interlocutory 
appeal. 
I agree that the court of appeals simply got it wrong in Mike's case, and reviewed a non-
final order to push a decidedly mormon agenda through the courts, and entirely inconsistent with 
the prior case law on the mater. But for the jurisdictional ruling by the Court of Appeals the 
Court of Appeals it would have to be silent and wait, and not express an opinion on the issues 
presented. Rather than doing this the Court of Appeals created jurisdiction in Mike's case where 
none existed by overturning the precedent of the prior Utah Supreme Court case law. Therefore 
I ask that that the Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme Court restore and enforce the precedent in 
Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins., Co., 44 P.3d 663, 670-71 (Utah 2002) and overturn Mike's case. 
Issue 2, The court of appeals lacks jurisdiction as the order is not final and 
distinguished from tlte order in Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St. George City, 2015. 
Plaintiff and Appellee Roger Bryner moves the court to dismiss this case for lack of 
jurisdiction, specifically in the fact that the remand order in this case, unlike the remand order in 
Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St. George City, 2015 Utah App. 158 (hereinafter Mike's Case) 
is not a final order. Where jurisdiction is lacking, the appeal must be dismissed. Miller, 44 P.3d 
at 670-71. Plaintiff filed a motion for judicial notice of documents in case 130500429 ie. Mike's 
Case at R. 606-607. The court in Mike's case incorrectly remanded to conduct a fact intensive 
inquiry and hearing at the administrative level, while in this case the court correctly found notice 
was defective, and remanded in order to allow the notice to be cured at what the trial court 
incorrectly believes is the correct level. 
1) The parties reached a stipulation in Mike's Case to hold a trial. See Docket, Exhibit A at 
R. 608-613 and stipulation Exhibit B at R. 614-618. However in this case there has been no 
stipulation and no trial. 
2) The court in Mike's Case entered an order approving the stipulation of the parties to 
proceed to trial at the request of either party. See Exhibit 3 of Motion for Judicial Notice at R. 
619. 
3) The court in Mike's Case received a request to set trial by on the of the parties. See 
Exhibit 4 of Motion for Judicial Notice at R. 620-621. 
4) The Court in Mike's Case then noticed both parties that a final hearing on the mater, as 
they stipulated to hold, would be held. See Exhibit 5 of Motion for Judicial Notice at R.622-623. 
5) The Court in Mike's Case then held a noticed trial and entered a final remand order after 
trial. See exhibit 6 of Motion for Judicial Notice at R.624-627. 
6) By contrast there has never been a stipulation to any proceedings in this case, much less a 
stipulation to proceed to trial. 
7) There has never been a trial or hearing de-novo. The court specifically stated it would 
maintain jurisdiction for review after any proceedings on remand in this case. 
8) I have been unable to get my day in court, and the remand order of the court in this case 
specifically denies me my day in court until after the remand proceedings. 
This case is distinguished in that the Court in this case by what did not happen. In Mikes 
there was a final order after a trial, in which factual issues were not tried de-novo but remanded 
for administrative review. In this case there were only undisputed findings after summary 
disposition regarding a constitutionally defective notice, and a legally incorrect ruling that the 
reviewing court could substitute it's notice for notice from the Justice Court. While this is an 
error, it can be reviewed both on remand by the OLD at hearing at by the Trial Court which has 
not yet reached this issue and when specifically questioned about the issue said that it would first 
wait for a determination by the OLD on that specific issue before proceeding with a De-novo 
review. See r. 736, transcript of 5/1 1/2015 hearing reproduced below: 
3 MR. BRYNER: Additionally, I dispute that the OLD 
4 was notified of a warrant. 
5 THE COURT: You can save that argument for another 
6 day. You can make that argument to the agency if you wish. 
Thus unlike Mike's case, the issue of the lack of the existence of a warrant for which 
notice was given remains at best a disputed, and at worst for the OLD an undisputed fact which 
remains to first be addressed by the OLD upon remand and then upon de-novo review. 
Issue 3 On summary disposition it was correctly determined that tlte notice from the 
Justice court to tlte DLD was/or failure to comply witlt a citation, but no traffic 
citation ever existed. R. 640. 
At R.640 the court correctly found: 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, it was undisputed that the notice provided by 
the Division referred to a citation, and likewise undisputed that a warrant, and not a 
citation, was issued by the Justice Court, Based on that the Court remanded the matter to 
the Division to expressly consider the question with regard to the existence of a warrant, 
not as to a citation. See Order dated June 18, 2015, herein. That Order contemplates no 
further action by this Court until the agency completes its action. No further findings are 
necessary. 
Review of factual findings on a motion for summary disposition are only 
appropriate where they have been disputed by the parties. Here the DLD invited the error 
by arguing exactly what the court found, thus it has no basis to challenge the undisputed 
findings of fact. Furthermore on appeal they don't challenge the undisputed findings of 
fact regarding the non-existence of a citation. 
The case is actually very simple. The DLD was notified that a failure to comply 
with a citation occurred by a Justice Court. A full and fair de-novo factual review of the 
Justice Court record on summary disposition shows that no citation ever existed. These 
are the undisputed facts in the case. Therefore no suspension is warranted and the entire 
case should be over. Adding details about other things which may or may not lead to the 
suspension of a Driver's license, or complicating the procedure by having a reviewing 
appellate court and an administrative agency substitute their discretion to give notice 
under the statute for the original Justice Court, are not contemplated in law and simply 
not before any of the courts or administrative agencies. They would only be before the 
agency and reviewing courts if, and if ever, the Justice Courts notifies the DLD of the 
existence of a warrant, and not before. The Trial Court, in an effort to avoid a decisive 
ruling on the issues, sought to issue a remand. It should have simply held that a driver's 
license can't be suspended based upon an erroneous notification by the Justice Court 
where no factual basis for the notice exists. 
Issue 4, On summary disposition it was incorrectly determined that all issues from the 
Justice Court itself were not at issue, and the reviewing court or DLD could initiate 
proceedings under tlte statute. 
While the undisputed factual conclusions found at R.640 are correct factually, the 
legal question of what must be done now is still important. The court correctly analyzed 
the constitutional importance of the lack of notice at R.586 where the obvious legal 
conclusion "Property framing the issue by notice is important for two reasons: First, it 
informs the Petitioner of the actual basis for the proposed administrative action," 
however it went on to incorrectly find "and second, it ensures that the Division made its 
decision based on the actual facts that potentially Justify its action." There is no 
proceeding further with insufficient notice. If the division was not notified by the court 
of the existence of a warrant, then the legal basis for action under the plain language of 
UCA 53-3-221(3)(a) does not exist. Furthermore no amount of remand can fix the 
constitutional issue of lack of notice nor can it make the DLD a court which can notify 
itself of the existence of a warrant. 
But this question of constitutionality need not arise if the matter ends, for now, on 
the notice is given only by the Justice Court which issues the warrant, then no action by 
the district court or the DLD can provide the required prerequisite to initiate DLD 
proceedings. Maters of statutory interpretation are reviewed de-novo by the court of 
appeals. As argued in the DLD's own motion for summary disposition at R.460: 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-221 (3)(a) provides the Division may suspend a person's 
license "when the division has been notified by a court that the person has an 
outstanding unpaid fine, an outstanding incomplete restitution requirement, or an 
outstanding warrant levied by order of a court." ( emphasis added). 
Here there is no dispute, and indeed the DLD argued itself, that it was notified of a 
citation by a court. It can not suddenly become a court for the purposes of fulfilling the 
notification requirement of 53-3-221(3)(a). Nor can the reviewing appellate court make 
the decision to notify the DLD. Such a reading would be entirely inconsistent with the 
principle of legal review, akin to allowing the court of appeals to amend the charges or 
causes of action in a case under review. At most the reviewing appellate court can allow 
amendment of the charges by the proper originator of the claim. That originator would 
be the Justice Court, not the DLD by the plain language of the statute. 
Issue 5, The entire process, the special ruling by tJ,e court of appeals bot!, in Mikes and 
in tJ,is case granting jurisdiction wlten none exists, as well as the complete lack of 
notice at the Justice Court, Administrative level, Trial court, and court of appeals is an 
unconstitutional violation of the 14th Amendments right to due process and an 
egregious example of the State of Utah violating tJ,e rights of it's citizens without any 
due process at all. 
The Court in denying a motion to dismiss by the DLD ruled that my request to 
declare the statutory review process for issuance of a warrant unconstitutional. The 
request to declare the statute unconstitutional for lack of appellate review was found in 
paragraphs 22-28 of the amended complain at R.230-231. There was also a request to 
declare the statute overbroad found in paragraphs 29-32 at R.231-232. There was also a 
request to declare it unconstitutionally vague found in paragraphs 33-26 at R.232. These 
were all denied in the ruling at R.440 in paragraph 2 granting the motion to dismiss. 
Remand in this case for a trial de-novo is pointless. Based upon the rulings of law 
and undisputed facts on summary disposition there is nothing to try, only conclusions of 
law to review. The undisputed facts in this case, decided correctly at summary 
disposition, were that a warrant exists but the driver's license suspension notice and 
action by the Justice Court was for failure to comply with a citation and no citation ever 
existed. Given that the trial court ruled that it could not review de-novo the Justice court 
proceedings, and will not conduct a fact sensitive review of the proceedings at the trial 
court level, there is no possibility of Justice with a statute that is so twisted that any 
Justice court can unilaterally suspend a driver's license of any person for any reason 
brought for the first time by the DLD before the Court of Appeals, or the District Court, 
rather than brought by the issuing court. It is apparent from the record in this case that 
multiple warrants were issued, yet only one DLD suspension hearing occurred. The DLD 
can not initiate suspension under the plain language of the statute, only a court may. The 
reviewing court correctly determined as a mater of fact, at the request of the DLD itself, 
that no factual basis for the reason for suspension for which the notice was given exists. 
To allow the Court of Appeals at this point to substitute itself for the Justice Court and 
even give notice that the warrant still exists(does it? at what point in time exactly, writing 
of the brief, at the ruling, after appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, after appeal to the US 
supreme court, ... : ), would be to circumvent the plain language of the statute and make a 
mockery of the notice requirements of the 14th amendment of the US constitution and the 
equal application provisions as well. Nobody but Roger Bryner will have ever had his 
license suspended by the Court of Appeals in the State of Utah in a memorandum 
decision. If that does not demonstrate bias, and a written and specific intent by the same 
body to discriminate against the specific individual for over a decade, what does? See 
2006 UT App 398 "special leniency on the basis of pro se status is manifestly 
inappropriate." This is in fact a thinly veiled but explicit message from the Court of 
appeals to discard the protections of the 14th amendment of the US constitution for the 
disfavored party. There is nothing especially bad or wrong about my filings, in fact 
everything I submit is in general exceptional even for attorneys and I have a higher 
success ratio than most attorneys, and only the political opinions and agenda of the all 
mormon court of appeals is really at issue. No decision against the Mormons in state 
government will be forthcoming as long as a disfavored litigant who has been marked, by 
official opinion, for higher levels of scrutiny than those applied to Mormon attorneys. 
A copy of the 2006 UT App 398 opinion was found in the record of the Justice 
Court but not produced in the documents request production which appears at R.1-R.2 l 0. 
I sought to have the Justice Court produce the highlighted copy of that case by way of a 
records request and appeal to the district court, which is currently pending in case 
#20150685. Clearly the Judge in that case is reading that opinion EXACTLY as I was 
written, highlighting the code phrase instructing him to proceed against Roger Bryner 
specifically in violation of the 14th Amendment, and if the court of appeal intended 
otherwise, it can not reasonably expect that sort of an outcome given it's bad example. 
Conclusion 
I ask that the court of Appeals dismiss the appeal of the Defendant and my appeal 
for lack of Jurisdiction by the Court of Appeals as there is not a final order in this case. 
In the alternative I ask that the remand order of the Trial Court be modified to remand the 
case to await notice from the Justice Court of a warrant before taking any further action. 
In the final alternative I ask that the entire statutory basis for suspension due to a warrant 
be declared unconstitutional as there can be no review of the Justice Court proceedings at 
any higher level, and true de-novo review does not exist and can not be granted when the 
court of Appeals itself has come full circle and has a Justice Court judge relying on it's 
reasoning in 2006 UT App 398 to discriminate against Roger Bryner specifically in 
denial of his 14th amendment rights. 
Dated March 1, 2016 
Roger Bryner 
Certificate of mailing 
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Office of the Attorney General p _ r[. -~~., 1 _..-
4501 South 2700 West, PO Box 141775 _/_ ~---~------
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1775 
Facsimile: (801) 965-4608 
Email: brentburnett@utah.gov 
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The Order ofCou1·t js stated below: 
Date<!: June 18, 2015 /s/ Andrew H. Stone 
02:52:03 PM Districi Court .Judge 
KEVIN BOLANDER, Assistant Attorney General ( 115 l 1) 
MARCUS R. YOCKEY, Assistant Attorney General (14850) 
SF.AND. REYES, Attorney General (7969) 
Attorneys for Utuh Department of Public Safety 
4501 South 2700 Westt PO Box 141775 
Sall Lake City, Utah 84114-1775 
Telephone: (80 l) 96.5-4466 
Facsimile: (80 I) 965-4608 
Email: kbolander@utah.gov 
lN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUUT, 
SALT LAKE COlJNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Roger Bryner~ 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY. DRIVER LlCENSE DIVISION~ 
Respondent. 
ORDER~ 
Case No. 140906147 
Judge Andrew H. Stone 
The Court has made changes to the proposed order submitted by Res1mndent, after re,·icwing 
Petitioner's objections. The Court's additions are hi hold and the Court's deletions appear as 
strike-th roughs. 
This matter came hefore the Court in a hearing on May 11, 20 IS. There were several 
motions pending before thL· Court, including cross-motions for summary judgment. The Petitioner 
Roger Bryner represented himself and appeared by telephone. The Utah Driver License Division 
{"Division") \.Vas represented by Kevin Bolander, Assistant Attorney General. 
The parties brrcied, among other arguments~ whether the P!!tilioncr's driving privilege may 
00585 
June 18, 2015 02:52 PM 1 of 3 
be su~pcnded pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 53-3-221(3). The Petitioner argues that during 
the adminisrrative proceedings, the Division did not cc.msidcr the existence of an outstanding 
warrant againsl him, giving the Division no uL1thority to suspend his driving privilege because the 
agency decision was basetl on a different reason for suspension. The Division argues the Court 
cannot review the administrative record of the informal proceeding~ but instead should rule based on 
the arguments and evidence the parties submit during de novo rcvie'w of the final agency action. The 
Division also argues ony procedural d~fects with its administrative proceedings are cured by de 
novo review, therefore the Court may e-onsider argument. regarding whether suspension is warranted 
pursuant to Section 53-3•22 I (3 ). 
The Court rejects the Division's position that the Court should either substitute its own 
judgment for the Dh1ision's exercise of discretion or defer to the Division's decision when it is 
u nclcar the Division exercised its discretion with the actual facts before it. The statute plainly 
grnnts the Division discretion, but the parties' factual submissions do not indicate that th~ 
DiYision even knew of a wnrnrnt, as opposed to a citation, being issued against Petitioner. In 
such case, the alternative remedy of remand is appropriate. 
Aftt!r reviewing the briefs and arguments nod evidence submitted in this proceeding~ the 
Cou1t finds the evidence eontttined in the administruti·,·e rc-eere is insufficient to determine whether 
the Divi.sion was notified hy a Court of and considert:d the existence of an outstanding warrant 
against the Petitioner, as required under Utah Code§ 53-3-221 (3)(a). ~
pmeeediHg.i with this mnHc1· on trit1I de mwo. the The submissions of tile parties here indicate 
that Petitioner was informed of an outstanding citation, ns opposed to the existence of a 
warrant. Pro11erty framing the is~uc by notice is important for two reasons: First, it iuforms 
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the Petitioner of the nctual basis for the proposed admini~trative action, and second, it ensures 
that the Division made its decision based on the actual facts that potentially justify its action. 
The Court therefore remands this matter to the Division pursuan( to Utah Code Ann. Section 630-
4-404(1 )(b)(v), and instructs the Division to considt:r the existence of the outstanding warrant 
against the Petitiont:r when determining whether to suspend his driving privilege. 
End of Document-Court Approval Appears at Top of This Page 
CERTIFICATE OF Sfi:RVICI~ 
l hereby certify that on the 29rd day of May, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
[PROPOSED] was sent by email to: 
Roger Rl'yncr 
roger.bryner@yahoo.com 
PO Box 1082 
Clearfield. Utah 84089 
June 18, 2015 02:52 PM 
Bolander 
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Exhibit B 
ii.OGER BRYNER, 
Plaintiff, 
va. 
DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION, 
Defendant. 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT t..AKE 
SALT 1.AK.E comrl''l. S'fA'fE OF UTAH 
RULING 
Cnse No: 140906147 
Judge: ANDREW H STONE 
Date: .August 13, 1015 
Before che Court is Plaintiff Bryner's Motion re Findings of Fact and Law on 
Notification or Warrant by Justice court and Maintaining ~urisdiction After Remand. 
This is an appeal o( a a decision by the Utah Department ot Public Safety, Drivers' 
License Division (Division) to suspend Peti~ioner•s driver's license. Petitioner 
failed to appear at. a Ju6tice Court proceeding, and a warrant. was issued. 
Subsequently, the Division sent hlrn notice of an intent to suspend hi::; driver's license 
du~ to the existenc: of a citation. 
On cross-motions for summary judgrneot, it waa undisputed that the notice provided by 
t:.he Divioion referred co a ciLar.ion, and likewise undisputed that a warrant, and not a 
cttation, was issued by the Justice Court. Based on that the Cour~ remanded the matter 
to the Division to expressly consider the question with regard to the existence of a 
warrant, not as to a citation. See Order dated June 18, 2015, herein. That Order 
contemplates no further action by this Cour~ until the agency completes its action. No 
furthe.r findings ar~ necesaary. Plaintiff's Motirm for f'indingSJ,etc. is therefore 
denied. 
Date: 
CERTIF[CATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document 
case 140906147 by the method and on the date specified. 
MAIL: ROGER BRYNF.R PO BOX 1082 CLEARFIELD, UT 84089 
MAIL: KEVIN L BOLANDER 5272 S COI.LEGG DR STE 200 MURRAY UT 84123 
08/13/2015 /s/ MICHELLE AIJAf.<S 
Date: 
~rinted: 08/13/lS 10:41:22 
people for 
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Case No: 140906147 Date: Aug 13 1 2015 
Printed: 08/13/15 10:41122 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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